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AN UNHURRIED Vmw OF COPYRIGHT. By Benjamin Kaplan. New
York: Columbia University Press. Pp. ix, 142. $5.

I can unreservedly recommend An Unhurried View of Copy'right1 to specialist and non-specialist lawyer alike as the best springboard I know from which to dive into the murky waters of 1967
copyright problems. The title of this small volume has proved provocative to a number of the other "viewers" of copyright,2 but is,
in fact, singularly apt. It deserves a moment's notice. First, the "view"
Professor Kaplan gives us is one primarily in the sense of the second
definition of that noun in my dictionary, 3 "as, a just view of the
arguments or facts in a case," and only secondarily, infinitely gently,
though to me strongly persuasively, one in the sense of the sixth
definition, "as, to state one's views of a debated policy." Second, the
view is "unhurried" in the sense that it is presented with grace and
wit, with form and in ordered measure, Mozart, not Musorgski. It
is plainly the product of calm consideration, real scholarship, and a
I. The book comprises, with emendations, amendatory and supplementary, plus an
admirable table of cases and a judicious number of useful footnotes, the three James S.
Carpentier Lectures which its author delivered at the Columbia University School of
Law in March 1966.
2. Copyright is being "viewed" in the United States today by more people with more
concern in more ways than at any time in the past. The existence of this widespread
interest is evidenced by the voluminous record of the various congressional hearings on
proposed copyright revision legislation which itself comprises only the distillate of an
exponentially greater volume of words spawned at seminars, workshops, conferences,
proceedings, committee meetings, conventions, caucuses, and canvasses without number,
the spate of which continues unabated. Almost all these other viewers are "with alarm,''
and some seem to feel about an "unhurried" viewer the impatience of a drowning man
with an unhurried life guard.
3. M. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2842 (2d ed. 1959).
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needed time of ripening. But it is most assuredly not late, being
most timely arrived on the 1967 copyright scene; not dated, reaching
as it does not only to the technological realities of the 1967 modes
of using copyrighted works, but boldly into the future to suggest
that copyright must be so ordered as to stimulate, not stunt, the
coming modes which promise so brightly to enlarge the intellectual
life of man as machinery has already expanded his physical capacities.

The Author
"Ben" Kaplan is a legend in a number of places. One of these
places is the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Committee
on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Professor Kaplan was Reporter to the Advisory Committee
from 1960 to 1966. In this "hot spot," Ben became legend not by
being all-wise and ever-right, but by taking up the wheat and blowing away the chaff from the grain supplied in various idiosyncratic
ways by the diverse and quite unbashful members. Ben would cheerfully put in better words texts proposed by others to meet this or
that problem of federal civil procedure even when he did not agree
with the proposal. In the process he usually so illumined the proposal that it was forthwith discarded or straightaway adopted. When
the pressure of other demands led Ben to abandon his Reporter's
role, the legend compelled his reappointment as a member, and the
Chief Justice responded to the compulsion to the unanimous applause of the Committee and its chairman, Dean Acheson.
Another locus of the legend is the New York Copyright Bar,
where, though Kaplan is a name to conjure with, opinion is divided
as to whether the magic is black or white.
Last-and whether I add the customary "and not least" will
sway no one who holds a firm predilection-I shall note that Harvard Law School is another place where the Kaplan legend waxes
strongly. The rise of the Third Reich and the call of the army put
a period to Ben's career at the New York Bar in 1942, and barely
had he resumed that career after Nuremberg when, in 1947, he became first a visiting professor, then a professor, and now, since 1961,
Royall Professor of Law at Harvard. In the light of this swift ascent
in the academic hierarchy, I am inclined to the judgment of another,
who, as part of "an attempt to reclaim for the English language the
many fine affirmative words that have been lost it for so long, buried
under ponderable prefixes," characterized Ben as "a brilliant, becilic
professor." 4
4. The matter quoted in this sentence is selected, as an example of fair use of copyrighted material, from F. LAMPORT, SCRAP IRONY 36, 51 (1961). Miss Lamport shows her
"utterable wisdom" in this work as she is, at 2 Bond Street, Cambridge, at least, also
well known as Mrs. Benjamin Kaplan.
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The Book
The book follows the Carpentier lectures-and all Gaul-by
being divided into three parts: I. The First Three Hundred Fifty
Years; II. Plagiarism Reexamined; and III. Proposals and Prospects.
In part I, we are led from the chartering of the Stationers' Company by Bloody Mary in mid-sixteenth century England to the enactment of our present United States copyright statute in its general
form and principal details in mid-Edwardian America. '\,Ve are shown
a beginning in Crown censorship made stronger by skillful alliance
with private privilege, all molded by the political and economic
exigencies and opportunities of the printing press. We are led past
the familiar landmarks of Mansfield and Eldon, Story and Holmes,
to a statutory scheme devoid of sovereign censorship and dominated
by a vastly extended range of nearly-absolute private privileges modeled on the classic attributes of the personal property right. The act
contains only the most rudimentary recognition of the coming complications that technology will bring. This recognition takes the
form of a compulsory license provision intended to prevent copyright ownership from affording an indirect highway to domination
in the fields of player piano and phonograph manufacture. Professor
Kaplan, by concentrating on the scope of the rights and remedies
afforded by copyright in the views of the generations of judges who
have spoken to the subject, and by reminding us that abridgments,
restatements, dramatizations, and foreign language translations may
be, and often are, works of authorship in themselves, sometimes exceeding in artistry the original, gently leads us to recognize that
derivative works are not "copies" in the true sense. Thus, he shows
that, while absolute and rigorous prohibition over an extended span
of time may be appropriate to prevent unauthorized multiplication
of a work itself, a conditional and temperate ban over a much lesser
span of time may be sufficient to insure an author his due for his
contribution to the labors of others who create derivative works.
In part II, Judge Learned Hand tends to dominate the argument, and Professor Kaplan skillfully shows us how Hand's own
perceptive and powerful mind led him to make of his lifetime of
copyright opinions a masterful compendium of penetrating exegesis
of all sides of the question. The problem is, "What is infringement?"
A part of the answer is, "That depends." Professor Kaplan shows us
a number of the factors upon which Hand and his contemporaries,
avowedly, guardedly, or, sometimes, seemingly unconsciously, let it
depend. In classic copyright law theory, validity of a copyright does
not depend on the quantity or extent of the originality displayed by
an author in his work, but only on the fact that it was originalthat is, not so derived from a prior work as to be an infringement
of a postulated copyright thereof. In classic copyright law theory,
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infringement of a copyright is a conclusion solely derived from historical fact-the use that the accused plagiarist made of the copyrighted work-and does not depend on the existence of other sources
which he might have used and did not. In actual practice, these
theories have not always governed the result: works of striking originality are held infringed by much less "taking" than more commonplace efforts, and barefaced copying is found excusable if the copyrighted work did not commend itself as worthy to the court. Professor
Kaplan, through amusing analysis of some divergent "leading" cases,
shows us how the relatively monolithic positions of the 1909 Act with
respect to what is a "taking"-whether actionable or exempt-has
paradoxically created uncertainties as to what is an infringement of
copyright and has led to the disorderly growth of copyright-like
remedies at common law, with state-to-state discrepancies and anomalies.
In part III, Professor Kaplan pleads for a new expression of
American copyright policy rationally arrived at by informed lawgivers and not compromised by logrolling among competing interests, each armed with some political or economic power, each with
its own position, obsolescent or emergent, in the technology of modem times. Just as the printing press compelled the attention of the
Tudors, so the "computer" 5 compels the attention of the rulers, real
and titular, of the present day.
Copyright in Anglo-American law was descended from censorship and it may be that inept revision and ineffective or overreaching
revitalization of copyright today may bring about a rebirth of censorship through economic "side-effects." 6 Certainly, some drastic readjustments are required in basic copyright principles to avoid a
show-down confrontation with the computer, a meeting from which
the computer is as little likely to recede as the tide from its celebrated
confrontation with King Canute.
Professor Kaplan notes the sources of some of the difficulties that
have troubled copyright law in its attempts to keep up with technology. One, for example, is the "publication" concept which makes
a 200-copy edition of a country high school newspaper a publication,
but not a nationwide television broadcast. Another is the strained
interplay of notions of "performance" and "copy" by which an
apparatus owner who receives only electrical emanations and, after
5. I use the term "computer" as short hand for modem techniques of data storage
and retrieval, whether referring to various specific devices for electronic "bit" handling,
making photo- or micro-records of visually readable text, or whatever may next be devised mechanically or electrically to replace or augment libraries, including their catalogues and their contents.
6. Compare the just and well-stated alarm of G. GIPE, NEARER TO THE DUST (1967),
with the optimism of M. Muntyan, What Lies Ahead?, SATURDAY REVIEW, June 10, 1967,
at 14, that the interplay of computer and copyright can make authorship even more
rewarding socially and financially than the interplay of printing press and copyright.
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manipulation of them, delivers counterpart electrical emanations to
paying subscribers is "performing" the work represented by the
emanations, but is not, apparently, making a "copy" of it. I venture
to find in Professor Kaplan's book a regretful dissent from both of
these recently judicially-sanctified "principles" which seem to fly in
the face of common-sense and have both resulted from, and added
to, the over-protectionism which Professor Kaplan expressly deplores.
Professor Kaplan also notes that the impact of the recent Supreme
Court destruction of the once growing protectionism of common-law
unfair competition concepts, 7 with consequent resort to the federal
constitutional copyright power by those seeking to recover the lost
protection, and the threatened absorption of "common-law copyright" for "unpublished" works into the federal statutory scheme,
with consequent pressures for special rights and remedies, tend to
force upon the proposed comprehensive new federal copyright enactments wholly new diversities of problems and solutions. These
pressures will surely require that the basically simple-or as Professor Kaplan puts it, "innocent"-approach of the 1909 Act be abandoned for a much more complex and sophisticated law. In short,
the various possible permutations of different kinds of authors,
different kinds of works, and different kinds of "takings" may well
require for just and effective copyright as many combinations of
different kinds of remedies and different rates of recompense extending over different periods of time.
All, of course, is not perfect with An Unhurried View of Copyright. It is only fair to note that I am dismayed by Professor Kaplan's
blithe disregard of-or, do I detect a mildly annoyed impatience
with?-the problems of constitutional law that I see looming before
us as attempts are made to extend copyright to subject matter
judicially found not copyrightable under the 1909 Act, 8 to fill the
gaps blown by the Sears and Compco salvo in the protectionist bulwarks provided by the common law of unfair competition, and to
destroy without compensation the perpetual protection heretofore
enjoyed by unpublished works. But that is another matter to be
resolved another day, and for the present I urge you: Do buy this
book and don't wait for it to be available for the dialing on your
computer console.
W. Brown Morton, Jr.,
Member of the Virginia Bar
7. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &:
Co. v. Stilfel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964): "The works for which copyright may be secured under this
title shall include all the writings of an author."

